economy. Rather, it reflected a dominant welfare-state paradigm about the role of government that has guided political thinking for over 50 years but is now beginning to lose its grip.
The main aim of this article is to summarise some recent research findings on the rising paradigm on the optimal size of government that is replacing the welfarist paradigm.
The Rise and Fall of the Welfare State Paradigm
As understood by Thomas Kuhn (1962 /1970 in his study of scientific revolutions, paradigms are frameworks of concepts and assumptions that organise and explain experience. Over time, anomalies accumulate that become too difficult for the reigning paradigm to resolve; eventually it breaks down and is replaced by a new paradigm.
J. M. Keynes is a central figure in the emergence of the welfare-state paradigm, which he elaborated by rejecting the two extremes of state socialism and laissez faire and defining a middle ground between them. This new paradigm sanctioned 'the enlargement of the role of government' for the purpose of correcting deficient de mand (Keynes, 1936:380-1) . The problem with the new paradigm was that it con sisted of the middle ground between two extreme options in an extreme case: the Great Depression. After the Western economies recovered, growing liberalisation of international trade and (later) of capital flows challenged the role and compe tence of government's economic management. Eventually, the welfare state reached its limit in the 1990s, when fiscal deficits and public debt grew to propor tions diat destroyed government's ability to intervene effectively: additional govern ment spending raises interest rates, which negates any stimulus it provides to de mand.
The welfare state was seen as a political and social panacea by the post-war gen eration (die 'baby-boomers') who were die first beneficiaries of die full range of its services in health, educadon and social security, as well as by an older generation diat benefited in pardcular from the old-age pension. Even as it was being stretched far beyond its original purpose and problem-solving capabilides, it became closely idendfied widi democracy itself. But then it started to undermine welfare by weak ening die values and proteedve power of die central insdtudons of civil society: die family, die churches, and die voluntary associadons.
This problem has led Sandel (1996:3) to idendfy die two principal causes of what he calls Democracy's Discontent.
One is the fear diat, individually, and collecdvely, we are losing control of die forces diat govern our lives. The odier is die sense diat, from family to neighbourhood to nadon, die moral fabric of community is unravelling around us. These two fears -for die loss of self-government and die ero sion of community -togedier define die anxiety of die age. It is anxiety that die prevailing polidcal agenda has failed to answer or even address. Sandel (1996:351) ends his book by observing that 'the hope of our time rests ... with those who can summon die conviction and restraint to make sense of our condition and repair civic life on which democracy depends'.
Yet despite his valuable insights, Sandel fails to see die connecdon between large, intrusive government and die loss of autonomy and the erosion of commu nity. As taxes rise and die government gets bigger, it tends to crowd out the institudons of civil society by pre-empdng dieir roles and undermining individual selfreliance. This argument was made by Alexis de Tocqueville (1835 /1945 over 150 years ago, in an astonishing premonidon not only of die rise of the welfare state but also of the problems diat have brought it into quesdon:
The more [government! stands in die place of associadons, die more will individuals, losing die nodon of combining togedier, require its assistance: diese are causes and effects diat unceasingly create each odier ... The morals and die intelligence of a democradc people would be as much en dangered as its business and manufactures if die government ever wholly usurped the place of private companies.
Government has a roie to play in assisdng diose in genuine need. But should as many as a fifth of New Zealanders of working age, and nearly a third of New Zea land's children, be dependent on state welfare (Cox, 1998:27) ?
Paradigm Shift
There are numerous signs diat die dde of big government is receding. Interest is growing in die high compliance costs of government. The appearance of Osborne and Gaebler's book Reinventing Government (1992) suggests diat governments are trying to increase die efficiency of public spending. In his 1996 State of the Union Address, IIS President Bill Clinton announced diat die 'era of big government is over'. In die late 1990s, dicre is talk, and even some acdon, in die United King dom, die United States, Australia and New Zealand on replacing welfare handouts widi 'workfare'.
The principal reason for diis disillusionment widi big government is diat, if it grows beyond a certain point, die public sector reduces welfare radier dian increases it. In his overall analysis of die link between taxes and growdi, Gerald Scully, a leading pioneer in die field of die optimal size of government, has observed that:
Economic theory suggests that up to some level, government expenditures increase the productivity of private economic resources. The provision of nadonal defence and a judicial system protect private property and individ ual rights. Other publicly provided goods, such as infrastructure, also en hance private produedvity. Thus, up to some point, government expendi ture acts as a posidve externality on private economic aedvity ... Beyond some opdmal size of government, increased taxadon acts as a negadve ex ternality on die private sector. (Scully, 1996a:4-5) T he new paradigm therefore centres around die question: what is die opdmal size of government? Martin Feldstein (1996:26) has rccendy argued dial 'the central public finance question facing any country is die appropriate level of spending and dierefore of taxes'. A considerable literature has emerged that attempts to answer that question. Clark (1945) , inspired by Keynes, suggested that where die objective is to minimise inflation and stabilise the exchange rate, the optimal effective tax rate is likely to be around 25 per cent of national income (equivalent to about 21 per cent of GD P in New Zealand). More recentiy, Peden (1991:168-9) has found that over die period 1929-86 US government expenditure up to 17 per cent of GNP improved die productivity performance of die economy, but expenditures above diat level re duced 'die growdi of productivity'.
In its 1997 World Development Report, die W orld Bank (1997:168-71) emphasises the value of an 'effective state' diat facilitates radier dian impedes higher levels of economic performance. Its cross-country study examining die impact of 14 independent variables on die growdi in GDP per head concludes diat die size of government (measured by government consumption's share of GDP) has an important and consistendy negative impact on die standard of living (diough it did not search for an optimal level of tax or expenditure relative to GDP). Tanzi and Schukneeht (1997) compare die economic performance (growdi rates, gross fixed capital formation, inflation, unemployment, and debt) and social performance (life expectancy, infant mortality, education and income distribution) of 17 small, medium and large OECD countries. They conclude diat 'diere is no evidence' diat countries widi big governments out-perform die countries widi me dium and small governments. W hen government expenditure rises much above 30 per cent of GDP, diere are diminishing returns to die social gain from public spending (Tanzi & Schukneeht, 1997:167) .
Finally, a recent OECD report has concluded diat:
up to one-third of die growdi deceleration in the OECD (from around 5 per cent in 1965-73 to around 2 per cent in 1989-95) would be explained by higher taxes. In some European countries, tax burdens increased much more dramatically dian die OECD average, which would imply correspondingly larger effects on dieir growdi rates. (Leibfritz, Thornton & Bibbee, 1997:49) Optimal Tax Levels for Growth and Employment Caragata (1998) presents die final report of die New Zealand Inland Revenue's Taxa tion Economics Group. One of die principal aims of our research project during 1994-97 was to determine die level of tax diat is optimal with respect to two simul taneous objectives: (i) maximising economic growdi and employment; and (ii) elFiciendy minimising tax evasion. O ur approach was to estimate a range for the ratio of tax to GD P and die tax mix (direct and indirect tax relative to GDP) diat would maximise economic growdi and employment and efFiciendy minimise tax evasion.
For New Zealand, we concluded that die optimal level of total tax (the level at which economic growdi is maximised) is probably located between 15 per cent and 25 per cent of GDP. W e used five separate sets of models, widi diree research teams. This multiple-mediods approach was designed to provide reassurance about the quality of die results.
Scully (1996a) uses a non-linear Cobb-Douglas production function model diat combines analysis of die tax mix, die ratio of tax to GD P and die rate of real eco nomic growth. The model can also be used to estimate die tax burden and tax mix that maximise employment growdi and economic growdi, and minimise deadweight loss. The model involves an economy widi a public sector and a private sector, ex hibiting constant returns. The latter feature of die model is supported statistically by die data. W idi diis constraint, and using die empirical estimates for die m odel's parameters, positive growdi paths emerge. The empirical basis of the model is crucial: misleading results could be obtained if arbitrary values were assigned to the parameters. The rate of growdi is a function of the tax level, and die model facili tates a calculation of the value of the latter rate diat maximises output growdi.
Scully (1996a) estimates diat New Zealand loses two percentage points of growth a year because total taxes were higher dian 20 per cent of GDP. His model yields a growth-maximising tax level range, covering die years 1927-94, of 16.4 per cent to 23 per cent, for an average of 19.7 per cent of GDP. Scully also finds that the growth-maximising tax levels for some odier countries are consistent with diose for New Zealand.
Research by Scully (1996c) covering the period 1951-94 in New Zealand indicates diat a one percentage point increase in die ratio of tax to GDP appears to have its strongest impact in labour markets on employment growdi, although die impacts on labour force participation and die unemployment rate are also strong. A one percentage point increase in die ratio of tax to GDP in New Zealand lowers employment growdi by over 42,470 workers, decreases labour force participation by 11,900 workers and increases die unemployment rate by about 15,900. The optimal tax level for maximising employment is about 20 per cent of GDP. Ballard and Fullerton (1992:118-19) note diat deadweight loss analysis has typically ignored die effects of administration costs and compliance costs. By contrast, the work for New Zealand's Inland Revenue by Scully (1996a), Caragata and Small (1996a) and Branson and I^ovell (1997) picks up diese effects in Üieir analysis of dynamic deadweight loss. Branson and Ixwell (1997) , using a two-lier model employing bodi economet rics and data envelopment analysis, conclude diat for die period 1946-95, on aver age, economic output fell short of its annual potendal by 17 per cent because taxes were at 35 per cent of GDP radier dian a growth-maximising rate of 22.5 per cent of GDP. This 'deadweight loss' is die gap between actual and potential economic per formance arising from taxes. Branson and Ixwell conclude diat if deadweight losses were added to the existing tax burden, the cfTecdve tax rate would be 51 per cent of GDP, not 35 per cent.
Deadweight Loss Estimates
Scully (1996a) esdmates diat, for each dollar of tax in New Zealand, diere is a long-run cost to die economy of about $2.70. The magnitude of these results is confirmed by Caragata and Small (1996a) and andcipated by Usher (1991) , Bird (1991) and Feldstein (1995) . These magnitudes are also consistent widi die cumula tive aggregation of output losses imposed by government intervention anticipated by Mancur Olson (1996) . Thus, a cost-benefit analysis approach to tax policy-making would operate on die assumption diat, for a dollar of government spending to be justified, it would have to produce a long-run benefit of at least about $2.70.
Optimal Tax Levels for Efficiently Reducing Tax Evasion
Another approach to estimating die optimal size of the government is to determine die tax level diat efficiently minimises die hidden economy and tax evasion. Twenty-five ago, when OECD countries' tax levels were averaging about 30 per cent of GDP, various studies estimated diat dieir hidden economies ranged from 7 per cent to 16 per cent of GDP. Thus, an average of about 10 per cent of die income of OECD countries was unreported for tax purposes.
Currendy, widi die average ratio of tax to GDP of about 38 per cent, many countries have underground economies ranging from 10 per cent to 25 per cent of GDP, widi an average at about 16 per cent. That is to say, while dieir average tax Five models developed by Giles (1996) show diat die hidden economy re sponds more to tax than to infladon and government regulation, and that the hid den economy was pro-cyclical radier dian counter-cyclical. In New Zealand, the hidden economy is currendy around 11 per cent of GDP and tax evasion is esti mated at about $3.2 billion a year. As taxes are reduced, the hidden economy will shrink. But if taxes are driven to zero, die hidden economy will still be about 4 per cent of GDP, representing die hard core of criminal activity in the hidden economy that is driven by factors odier dian tax (Giles & Caragata, 1996) . Caragata & Giles (1996) develop a model for New Zealand estimating an effi cient tax evasion-minimising optimal tax level of 21 per cent of GDP. This provides furdier corroboration diat die optimal tax level is close to 20 per cent of GDP. We find diat a mix of 33 per cent direct tax and 67 per cent indirect tax would most ef ficiendy minimise die size of the hidden economy and tax evasion. We conclude that if the tax department adopts scientific audit selection, there would be signifi cant tax revenue gains and significant savings in terms of administrative efficiency for die tax department and compliance cost savings for business.
The Optimal Tax Mix
Two models diat we developed for New Zealand widi a growdi-maximisation objec tive favour a tax mix diat emphasises direct taxes. Anodier model widi a similar objective emphasises indirect taxes. A fourdi model widi an objective of minimising tax evasion emphasises indirect taxes.
All the models indicate diat die total tax burden is far more important than die tax mix in its impact on economic growth and tax evasion. Branson and Ixivell (1997) conclude diat die level of tax is six times more important dian die tax mix in influencing growdi. Scully (1996b) concludes diat a mix of 57 per cent direct tax and 43 per cent indirect tax would maximise economic growdi at a tax:GDP ratio of 20 per cent. Branson and Lovell (1997) conclude diat, on average, a mix of 65 per cent direct tax and 35 per cent indirect is optimal for promoting economic growdi in New Zealand at an average optimal tax:GDP ratio of 23 per cent. Caragata and Small's (1996b) non-linear model estimates diat, widi a ratio of tax to GDP of 20 per cent, tax policy would most accelerate economic growdi when the tax mix is 28 per cent direct tax and 72 per cent indirect. This model finds diat die relationship between growdi and direct taxes is always negative: which implies that a tax mix of zero direct taxes and 100 per cent indirect taxes would potentially maxi- mise economic growth. However, the Caragata-Small model is not free of meas urement error and its conclusions are tentative and subject to caution despite their confirmation of the strong trend in economic theory favouring the abolition of the income tax.
Finally, Caragata & Giles (1996) find that a mix of 33 per cent direct and 67 per cent indirect would most efficiently minimise the size of the hidden economy and tax evasion.
W hile both the objectives of maximising economic growth and minimising the hidden economy suggest that the current tax mix favouring direct tax over indirect is less than optimal, it seems that a growth-maximisation objective suggests a frontier mix with a rough balance between the two. Thus, too much weight on indirect taxes in pursuit of reducing the size of the hidden economy could undermine economic growth. More research on these new findings is required.
Implications for Fiscal Policy
All countries have paid a high and often unseen price (in terms of reduced growth and employment and higher tax evasion) for climbing the tax mountain in pursuit of the objectives of the welfare state. The huge increase in the size of government that occurred mainly between the early 1970s and the late 1980s was a failure in eco nomic development and policy management.
T he old ideological paradigm of the welfare state is now beginning to give way to die empirically based paradigm of the optimal size of government. How can governments most rapidly incorporate the insights of the new paradigm into its fis cal policies?
Tax policy. The first priority is to cut income taxes so that the total tax burden falls and the tax mix places greater emphasis on consumption tax. Tax cuts have weaker growth effects at higher rates (such as 35 per cent of GDP) than at lower rates (such as 25 per cent of GDP). Tax cuts are also best applied before an economy falls into recession.
Crisis management There is nothing wrong with counter-cyclical financing and government deficits as long as they occur only in emergencies and for short periods. Keynesian fiscal strategies became discredited because politicians wanted to run deficits even during boom times in order to buy votes.
Universality. End universal welfare benefits, which benefit the rich unnecessarily. Help those who need it. Means test all social services and programmes.
Transparency and accountability. Each year, all efficiency and benchmarking reports produced for government departments and agencies should be made public so that taxpayers can determine if they are obtaining value for money from their taxes.
Public choice: The public should be given more choice about how to spend their money. Many people who are dissatisfied with government provision of police, education and healdi services opt for private sector solutions, but cannot avoid paying taxes. Thus, they pay twice for these services when they opt for private provision of such services.
Timing. It took 40-50 years to push the state's share of die economy to its current level. It may take a decade or so to move taxes down to about 22-25 per cent of GDP, in part because of die need for a smoodi transition. It should not be allowed to take much longer dian diat, because higher economic growth is needed in order to finance die expected increase in spending on healdi services when die retirement of die baby-boom generadon peaks in 2025.
T he culture of public control, or regulatory and intrusive management, that has grown up under the welfare state must be ended and replaced widi the culture of public service diat respects taxpayers as die shareholders of government. The greater die numbers demanding benefits from government, die greater is the welfare dependency of die populadon, and the greater the level of government control. The greater die level of control, the less acceptable and the more wasteful are gov ernment services likely to be. Reducing taxes helps to encourage less wasteful spending and greater personal responsibility.
T he new paradigm of die optimal size of government offers politicians die basis for addressing 'democracy's discontent' by reducing die culture of dependency arising f rom the intrusive welf are state and promodng self-development and learning as die basis for national re-invigoradon and enhanced international compeddveness.
